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ABSTRACT
Direct inter-vehicle communication enables numerous safety
applications like intersection collision warning. Beacons –
periodic one-hop link-layer broadcast messages containing,
e.g., location, heading, and speed – are the basis for many
such applications. For security, current work often requires
all messages to be signed and to carry a certificate to
ensure integrity and authenticity. However, high beacon
frequency of 1 − 10 Hz and dense traffic situations lead to
significant communication and computational overhead. In
this paper, we propose several mechanisms to significantly
reduce this overhead while maintaining a comparable level of
security. The general idea is to omit signatures, certificates,
or certificate verification in situations where they are not
necessarily required. This creates a security-performance
trade-off that we analyze in detail. The results show that
significant savings can be achieved with only small impact
on security.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General
General Terms
Security, Reliability, Performance
Keywords
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), Security, Efficiency
1. INTRODUCTION
When looking at recent standardization efforts and fields
tests it becomes clear that beaconing will initially be
the most important form of communication for upcoming
C2X eSafety applications. Examples of such applications
include all forms of cooperative awareness messages like
intersection collision warning where vehicles approaching
an intersection periodically exchange status data to detect
potential collisions and warn drivers accordingly.
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In the context of vehicular communication, beaconing is
the periodic transmission of packets as (single-hop) link-
layer broadcast to nearby vehicles or road-side units [1].
Those packets typically contain at least the current location,
heading, and speed of the sending vehicle.
Despite its benefits, inter-vehicle communication (IVC)
systems also open opportunities for abuse when imple-
mented in naive and insecure ways. Security mechanisms
are needed, which ensure integrity and that a receiver
is able to recognize valid senders. Many solutions use
signatures based on asymmetric cryptographic mechanisms
like ECDSA together with other mechanisms [2, 3].
On the other hand, signatures and certificates lead to a
significant consumption of communication bandwidth and
processing power. The earlier aggravates the problem that
the wireless communication medium can become oversatu-
rated in situations of high vehicle density, the latter demands
considerable CPU performance.
The goal of this work is to provide a practically-oriented
solution that reduces this security overhead without sub-
stantially reducing security.
2. ANALYSIS AND RELATED WORK
When beaconing is unprotected, internal and external
attackers can easily run attacks like spoofing, beacon sup-
pression, manipulation, or replaying. Evidently, there is
a strong need to prevent especially those attacks that
might negatively affect reliability of eSafety applications.
Integrity protection can prevent spoofing and manipulation
attacks. Combined with timestamps or serial numbers this
also addresses replay attacks. We do not consider beacon
suppression here. In general, most security mechanisms
proposed so far apply the following basic approach [2, 3]:
1. Vehicles are equipped with asymmetric cryptographic key
pairs (VK ,SK ) and certificates (Cert) issued by a trusted
certification authority (CA).
2. Senders sign beacons using the vehicle’s signature key
SK , and receivers verify them using the corresponding
verification key VK . Both signature and certificate
containing VK are attached to every beacon.
3. Beacons not containing a valid signature and certificate
are ignored by receivers.
4. Beacons contain timestamps or sequence numbers to
prevent replay attacks.
5. Signature keys are stored in and managed by tamper-
resistant hardware to prevent extraction from vehicles for
unauthorized use.
Systems following the outlined approach have been pro-
Neighbors 30 byte payload 211 byte payload
1 4901,96 2225,52
50 98,04 44,51
100 49,02 22,26
250 19,61 8,90
500 9,80 4,45
Table 1: Packet rates per node per second
posed e.g. in the IEEE 1609.2 standard, the SeVeCom and
NoW projects, and by various other researchers. Variations
include the use of pseudonyms for privacy protection, the
certification architecture, or the use of group signatures [4].
But all approaches introduce two significant problems:
1. Signatures and certificates increase the beacons’ size and
create a significant protocol overhead.
2. Creating and verifying signatures creates a significant
computational overhead.
Most approaches suggest the use of Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography (ECC) in vehicular networks, as ECC signatures,
keys, and certificates are smaller than their RSA counter-
parts [5]. A 224-bit ECDSA signature excluding certificate
requires 56 bytes compared to 256 bytes for an equivalent
RSA-2048 signature. Including certificates and additional
management information, a 224-bit ECDSA signature and
certificate as proposed by IEEE 1609.2 [3] needs 181 bytes,
a corresponding RSA-2048 certificate about 3−4 times that
size. In accordance with [3], we assume 56 bytes for the
signature and 125 bytes for the certificate in this paper.
Using ECC instead of RSA lessens problem 1 to some
extent, but signature plus certificate still require a substan-
tial amount of bytes. Whereas ECC signature generation
is fast, verification is comparatively costly, so problem 2
remains. Use of dedicated ECC ASICs [6] would increase
manufacturing costs.
[7] builds on TESLA with delayed key disclosure using
message authentication codes (MACs) instead of costly
asymmetric cryptography. However, the approach requires
strict time synchronization and allows only delayed beacon
verification after key disclosure. This does not fit well to
dynamic and time-critical vehicular networks.
A deeper analysis of the impact of additional 181 bytes
payload is provided in Tab.1. The table shows the theo-
retical upper bound of packets that can be sent per node
and per second for different node densities. The values were
calculated using the equation
TX = TPRE + TSIG +
(16 + 8 ∗ LENGTH + 6)
DATARATE
+
TSYM
2
from [8], assuming 6 Mbps data rate, TPRE = 32μs, TSIG =
TSYM = 8μs, a 36 octets MAC header , and AC-3 traffic [9].
Although realistic values will be lower due to packet
collisions, one can easily see that in high vehicle densities
above 250 neighbors, 10Hz beaconing rate cannot be sus-
tained any more with 211 bytes payload. Considering only
30 bytes sized packets without security overhead, almost 500
neighbors can be supported.
Computational overhead of signing beacons is one sig-
nature generation when sending a beacon sent, and up
to two signature verifications, when receiving a beacon;
verifying the packet signature and the CA signature of the
certificate. Assuming a neighbor density of 200 vehicles and
beaconing rates between 1 and 10Hz, each vehicle needs
to generate between 1 and 10 signatures per second and
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Figure 1: Overhead due to signing.
needs to verify between 400 and 4000 signatures per second.
Typical hardware for on-board units used in upcoming field-
trials is expected to have e.g. a Power PC CPU at 400
MHz [10]. Actual crypto performance depends very much
on implementation, but own experiments indicate that this
hardware will not be able to do more than a few dozens
of verifications per second using ECDSA-224 and optimized
software libraries. Dedicated ASICs are expected to be able
to handle the cryptographic load at moderate costs [6].
Still, additional costs for ASICs and scarce channel
bandwidth motivates our work on mechanisms to reduce
computational and protocol overhead of signed beacons
while maintaining at least a comparable level of assurance.
3. EFFICIENT SECURE BEACONING
STRATEGIES
As outlined earlier, signature based protection of bea-
coning involves signatures as well as certificates. Fig. 1
illustrates actions and related overhead. Signatures need to
be generated, transported, and verified, whereas certificates
are pre-generated and only need to be transported and
verified. Generation and verification lead to computational
overhead, transport to communication overhead.
Aiming at the reduction of protocol and computational
overhead, one could basically
• omit beacon signature generation,
• omit transmitting a certificate with a message,
• omit transmitting a signature with the message,
• omit certificate verification, or
• omit beacon signature verification.
Multiple of these options can be applied simultaneously
with certain dependencies, where e.g. omitting the certificate
also implies omitting the certificate verification. While we
roughly sketch some of the ideas presented here in [11]
and [4, 12] proposes a basic form of certificate omission,
this is the first work to comprehensively discuss all the
different alternatives. We also propose several advanced
omission strategies and analyze their consequences in terms
of protocol and computational complexity, and particularly
in terms of security implications as some beacons will not
be verifiable instantly after reception. Our strategies do not
omit operations unconditionally, but instead only in certain
cases depending on a vehicle’s context or with a certain
probability. This allows a fine-grained tuning of a security–
performance trade-off. We argue that such a probabilistic
approach to security could be an interesting alternative to
classic deterministic approaches that try to deliver security
guarantees at a high cost. Probabilistic security strategies
might fit very well to dynamic networks like VANETs.
3.1 Omitting Certificates and Certificate Ver-
ifications
A substantial part of security-induced communication
overhead is the certificate attached to every message. A
certificate of the sender is needed by a receiving node for two
reasons: First, the certificate contains the verification key
VK needed to verify the signature. Second, the certificate
asserts validity of VK by a trusted authority.
As already proposed in [4, 12, 11], one can reduce
computational overhead of certificate verifications without
negative effect by storing verified certificate signatures in a
local signature store. This saves the costly verification of
certificates attached to subsequent packets from the same
node, and thus already cuts the computational costs of
handling received packets almost by half.
We can even reduce communication overhead notably
by storing certificates: If node A locally caches a verified
certificate of another node B, then B can omit its certificate
in subsequent packets. If signature and ID contained in
a beacon allow identification of the corresponding VK , a
receiving node can verify the signature of received beacons
without certificate. The only question is, when must a
node attach his certificate, and when may he omit it?
If communication partners have not exchanged certificates
previously, omission of certificates will lead to cases where a
node receives a beacon containing no certificate from a node
from which it has no certificate yet. Such a packet must be
regarded as invalid or signature verification must be delayed
until VK is available. As the amount of bandwidth that can
be saved by omitting 125 bytes certificates is tremendous,
we argue that certificate omission is reasonable if the time
period until a node is able to verify such beacon signatures
is small and this case does not occur too often.
[4, 12] proposes to reduce communication overhead by
leaving out certificates on a periodic schedule, i.e., only
every nth beacon packet contains a certificate. We call this
Periodic Omission of Certificates (POoC) here. Assuming
periodic beaconing with a beacon interval Δb, the period
until a node can verify packets from another node is (n −
1) · Δb in the worst case. While the scheme reduces the
communication overhead, it has the drawback that it is
independent of vehicle context. For instance, if a vehicle
drives fast, the consequence of providing a certificate only
every nth packet may result in violation of safety margins.
With Δb = 0.5 s and n = 4, a vehicle may have to wait up to
1.5 seconds until it can verify the beacons of another vehicle.
At 200 km/h, this corresponds to 83 meters, too much for
many safety applications. With higher beacon frequency
and lower speed, the scheme may be appropriate, though.
We propose an enhanced neighbor-based scheme for cer-
tificate omission that takes into account topology changes
explicitly and respects the beacon interval length.
3.1.1 Neighbor-based Certificate Omission (NbCO)
Here, we utilize the fact that every node roughly learns its
neighbors in wireless transmission range through beaconing.
A node can monitor neighborhood changes and base the
decision whether to attach certificates or not.
When node A is about to send a beacon bti+1 , A
determines if new neighbors were added to its neighbor table
since the last beacon bti . If yes, a certificate Cert(VK) is
attached to beacon bti+1 , else it is sent without certificate.
This leads to cases where a node cannot verify a beacon
because it does not yet possess an appropriate certificate.
However, the worst case is to wait for one beacon interval
period because the receiving node will include its certificate
in the subsequent beacon following the described strategy.
Yet, independent of the omission scheme, more certificate
misses may occur due to a lossy channel. In order to
avoid indeterminably long wait times for the certificate, we
propose that nodes could explicitly solicit for certificates if
a certificate is not available within Δb. In the example,
B would send a certificate request causing A to include
a certificate in the next beacon. Alternatively, nodes
could send certificates in n consecutive beacons after a
neighborhood change to reduce the chance for packet loss.
As such modifications might make our results highly
dependent on channel loss assumptions, we will not consider
such enhancements for the moment and just implement
the basic approach in our evaluation where we show the
effectiveness and suitability both regarding saved bandwidth
and unverifiable beacons.
3.2 Omitting Signatures and Sig. Verification
Additional communication overhead is saved by skipping
signatures entirely. This implies also that signatures do
not have to be created and verified, avoiding any security
overhead. However, omitting signatures also nullifies au-
thentication and integrity protection – which means that
the data should not be used for any critical applications.
Following the general idea of this work, we propose to
use signatures selectively, that is, to secure only a certain
share of all beacons depending on the situation. This saves
overhead where possible, but also maintains security where
necessary.
3.2.1 Situation-based Signing
As a baseline, every nth beacon or one beacon in a time
interval t should be signed to ensure a continuous chain of
trusted data. Unsecured data is sent in between, which
can be matched with the trusted data for example using
movement prediction. Although this saves overhead, critical
situations require more trustworthiness to enable reliable
decisions for safety-related applications. Therefore, we
propose situation-based signing to balance between security
and communication overhead.
In this scheme, we base the decision to sign a beacon or
not on current vehicle context. By default, all beacons are
only periodically signed. As soon as a vehicle discovers a
potentially dangerous situation using the insecure beacons,
it starts to attach signatures to all sent beacons. Assuming
that all involved vehicles detect hazards independently, all
sent beacons will be signed in critical situations.
3.2.2 Omitting Signature Verification
Computational load is more or less exclusively determined
by signature verifications and not by signature generations.
This is mostly because a vehicle will receive a magnitude
more packets than it sends in dense traffic and will thus have
to do much more signature verifications than generations.
When addressing computational load, it is therefore rea-
sonable to save on signature verifications and let the receiver
decide which signatures to verify and which not. If a
vehicle decides which signatures should be verified and which
can be left unchecked, the receiver can directly control its
computational load. The drawback is of course that an
attacker might inject spoofed packets with invalid signatures
hoping that receivers will not check them. Hence the goal
is to minimize such missed false signatures, while effectively
reducing the computational load.
RB 
PB 
B d 
Figure 2: Calculation of position prediction error d
Periodic Verification Strategy: Here, each vehicle
always verifies signatures of beacons of new vehicles not yet
contained in its neighbor table. From that on, it only verifies
every nth signature from the same source. Intermediate
beacons are accepted as genuine without further checking.
Without mobility and resulting neighbor changes, this
strategy reduces the verification rate down to 1
n
.
As indicated, an attacker might create packets using the
spoofed source address of other neighboring vehicles and
invalid signatures and hope that other vehicles accept these
packets. Chances that packets are accepted by another
vehicle are pretty good, actually n−1
n
. In those beacons,
the attacker can claim arbitrary positions, vehicle speeds,
etc. Assuming that damage done by false information
corresponds to the deviation from real values, our second
strategy takes this into account and verifies only those
packets that contain suspicious values.
Context-Adaptive Verification Strategy: Here, we
predict upcoming beacon information from neighboring
vehicles. If vehicle A has received a series of beacons
containing position and speed from vehicle B, A can likely
predict future position and speed of B using a linear
estimation like a Kalman filter. The Kalman filter is an
efficient recursive filter that estimates the state of a dynamic
system from a series of incomplete and noisy measurements.
As before, A verifies the signature of the initial packet
from B as well as every nth packet. n can be selected
comparatively large. A also initializes a new Kalman filter
KB for Bs position and speed. As illustrated in Fig. 2,
whenever a new beacon from B is received, A updates the
Kalman filter and calculates the position prediction error d,
i.e., the distance between prediction PB and RB contained
in the beacon. The probability p to verify the beacon’s
signature is chosen based on d.
The deviations from the likely behavior of another vehicle
should determine the risk for spoofed packets to be checked.
We set the signature verification probability pcheck as
pcheck(d) = ω ∗ (1− e−(d/β)
α
) (1)
This is the cumulative distribution function of a Weibull
distribution multiplied by a weight ω. A detailed discussion
of this is provided in the evaluation section (Section 4.2).
Further optimizations of the scheme could verify beacons
of risky positions first and take the currently available
computational resources into account.
4. EVALUATION
We now analyze some aspects of the mentioned ap-
proaches by means of simulations. After introducing our
simulation environment, we analyze the efficiency and secu-
rity of certificate omission as well as of signature verification
omissions. We have chosen these two examples to show the
potential of our approaches to significantly reduce overhead
while keeping the actual level of security.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed
schemes, we conducted simulations using the Java-based
simulation tool JiST/SWANS [15]. Based on version 1.0.6,
Parameter Urban Highway
Number of nodes 100− 1000 ≈ 100− 1000
Field size ≈ 3000m ×
3000m
≈ 12 km, mult.
lanes per dir.
Node dens. (neigh./node) ≈ 5− 22
Node velocity (m/s) ≈ 25 ≈ 40
Mobility model STRAW [13] FleetNet [14]
Link-/MAC-Layer IEEE 802.11p, 5.9GHz, 3MBit/s
Transmission range (m) 250
Beacon interval (ms) 100− 1000
Simulation time (s) 60
Simulation runs 10
Table 2: Overview on simulation parameters
we added several extensions, particularly the beaconing
mechanism including neighbor tables, a security module to
virtually attach certificates and signatures, and an imple-
mentation of the Kalman filter to predict neighbor positions.
Relevant simulation parameters are summarized in Tab. 2.
4.1 Efficiency of NbCO
We first investigate the efficiency of neighbor-based cer-
tificate omission (NbCO, Section 3.1.1) and compare it with
periodic omission (POoC) of certificates as presented in [4,
12]. We use two metrics for this evaluation. First, we
measure the numbers of beacons with and without certificate
attached. The percentage of beacons sent without certificate
directly reflects the saved bandwidth as every certificate
has a fixed size. Second, the number of not instantly
verifiable beacons due to missing certificates is important
because nodes then have to delay verification until they
receive a corresponding certificate. While the neighbor-
based approach implicitly provides certificates with the next
beacon, the amount of such cases still should be low.
Several factors influence the proposed schemes. One core
factor is the beacon frequency. If beacons are transmit-
ted with high frequency, saving bandwidth is particularly
important to reduce channel load. Another influencing
factor is node density ρ, which we denote as the average
number of neighbors of a node. Saving bandwidth is more
valuable in high-density scenarios, as the channel is more
likely congested here. A third aspect is related to mobility in
VANETs. Node movement patterns differ notably between
cities and highways. In particular the highway scenario
poses a special challenge to the system because nodes move
fast, on multiple lanes, and on long road segments.
4.1.1 Bandwidth Savings
Fig. 3 (left) shows the amount of certificates that are
omitted by NbCO and POoC. In most cases, NbCO omits
certificates in more than 70% of all sent beacons. One
key influence is the time between consecutive beacons.
The longer the beacon interval, the more beacons are
sent with certificates attached and the less bandwidth can
be saved. This is to be expected as the likelihood of
neighborhood changes increases with the length of this
period and certificates are only attached if the a new
neighbor was discovered since the last beacon. In case
of 10Hz, NbCO saves over 95% of bandwidth induced by
certificate transfer. In contrast, in case of POoC and n = 3,
savings are independent of the beacon interval and stay at
66%. Hence, the NbCO performs better in case of high and
medium beaconing frequency, whereas POoC is better with
larger beacon intervals. Results in Fig. 3 (left) also show
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Figure 3: Certificate Omission: Relative saving (left), absolute saving (middle), unverifiable packets (right)
the influence of node movement patterns and node densities.
High node velocity and traffic in only two directions lead to
more neighborhood changes and thus less effectiveness on
highways. The same applies to situations with higher node
density. Comparing low density of ρ ≈ 5 neighbors with
a medium density of ρ ≈ 22 neighbors per node, NbCO
performs worse than the POoC under high node density,
large topology change rate, and low beacon frequencies.
Looking at absolute numbers of sent beacons in Fig. 3
(middle), we find that for NbCO the absolute number of
beacons sent with certificate attached is almost constant
regardless of the beacon interval because the number of
beacons with attached certificate is governed exclusively
by topology changes. This contrasts to POoC that highly
depends on the beacon rate. This is particularly relevant
because the overall certificate overhead can be kept constant
with respect to the beacon interval. Especially with high
frequency and thus increased channel capacity problems, the
neighbor-based approach yields best results.
4.1.2 Unverifiable Packets
As we explicitly accept the case that a node may not be
able to verify a packet instantly when omitting certificates,
it is important to analyze this potential drawback. In the
worst case, several missing position updates may lead to
an accident because the driver could not be warned in
time, rendering the application useless. Hence, as few as
possible beacons should be unverifiable and the delay until
verification should be as low as possible.
Fig. 3 (right) indicates, that in most scenarios, less than
2% of all received packets are affected by this problem.
Again, the highway scenario is affected more severely due
to more topology changes. Complementing the earlier
findings, more beacons cannot be verified in scenarios with
low node density – which is normal, because less beacons
carry certificates in these scenarios as shown before.
In the periodic approach, notably more beacons cannot be
verified instantly compared to the neighbor-based scheme.
This is particularly visible in the highway scenario – where it
is most important to be able to react quickly because of high
node velocity. Moreover, the worst case delay to receive a
beacon with certificate attached depends on n. While Fig. 3
(right) only shows results for an average vehicle density of
ρ ≈ 5, similar results could be reproduced with high density.
To finally compare the periodic omission and the neighbor-
based approach, we relate saved bandwidth and unverifiable
beacons in an efficiency metric. We calculate
Efficiency =
Beacons w/o Certificate
Not instantly verifiable beacons
As shown in Fig. 4, NbCO yields better efficiency in all
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Figure 4: Protocol efficiency, saved bandwidth vs.
unverifiable beacons.
cases except the city scenario with 10Hz beacon frequency.
Looking at the previous figures, the reason for this can be
found in a certain “overoptimization” in this scenario. POoC
achieves less unverifiable beacons because of a comparatively
moderate reduction of the overhead.
In summary, NbCO achieves very low overhead with high
beacon frequencies, constant overall certificate overhead
independent of beacon interval, a maximum delay until
verification of one beacon interval, and a generally low
percentage of beacons that are not verifiable instantly.
4.2 Efficiency of Sign. Verification Omissions
Eq. 1 uses a cumulative Weibull distribution function
as probability distribution function for verifying a packet
signature. The base is the distribution of Kalman prediction
errors, i.e., the distance by which the Kalman filter is off the
correct positions, in a normal simulation. We determined
this distribution and suitable parameters (α = 4, β = 10)
by extensive simulation experiments in many scenarios.
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To show the suitability of the cumulative Weibull distribu-
tion function, we compare it with two others shown in Fig. 5.
One is a fixed threshold where a distance prediction error
beyond 20m leads to verification while packets with lower
error are not checked. The second uses a linearly increasing
probability between 0 and 20m.
In our simulations, we use attackers spoofing positions
within a range of 200m around their actual position. We
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Figure 6: Signature verification omission: Packets checked (left) vs. unverified faked beacons (right)
argue that entirely random position claims can easily be
detected by a maximum radio distance thresholds. More-
over, the distance between positions in consecutive beacons
is limited to a maximum of 50m. As normal vehicles do not
drive that fast, larger jumps can be assumed improbable
within one beacon interval and thus be disclosed by a fixed
threshold. Kalman filter settings were also determined by
traffic simulations.
The results are shown in Fig. 6. On the left, one can
see that only a small fraction of signatures are actually
checked. For the linear distribution, this ranges between 8
and 14% while the fixed threshold and Weibull distribution
give almost identical results between 3 and 10%. This
directly translates to reduced computational overhead, as
every omitted signature verification saves one cryptographic
operation. Savings are higher for denser networks because
in less dense networks our mobility model makes vehicles
move faster. This reduces the accuracy of the Kalman filter
and thus increases the fraction of verified beacons.
While from a performance point of view, fixed threshold
and Weibull distribution seem equivalent, the right graph
shows that Weibull is actually superior. It shows the
fraction of attacker beacon messages that were not verified
by recipients. While with linear and Weibull distribution
around 0.5% of attacker beacons were not detected, the fixed
threshold misses around 1.25% of the attacker beacons. So
using the cumulative Weibull distribution function for the
signature verification decision provides a clear advantage
over the other two strategies. Note that the percentage of
missed attacker beacons is independent from node density.
Like with our previous evaluation, one can again conclude
that applying the context-adaptive signature verification
omission significantly reduces computational load at a bear-
able price. Missing 0.5% of attacker beacons gives an
attacker only a very small chance of cheating.
5. CONCLUSION
The problem of communication and computational over-
head due to security mechanisms is particularly distinctive
for beaconing, because beacon packets are transmitted as
broadcasts with comparatively high frequency by every
vehicle. Generating signatures, transmitting signatures and
certificates, and verifying them on the receiver side causes
notable communication and computational overhead solely
for the purpose of authenticity and integrity protection.
While adding dedicated cryptographic hardware might solve
the latter problem at a noticeable cost, at least the problem
of network bandwidth requires additional solutions.
In this paper, we address this problem and propose
schemes to reduce communication and computational over-
head. The main concept of our approaches is to omit
generation, transmission, and verification of signatures and
certificates where this is possible without significant infringe-
ment of security. The analysis carried out has shown the
efficiency of two of the proposed schemes and considers the
level of security achieved compared to the case when all
beacon packets are signed and verified. While future studies
are required to also analyze the rest of the proposed mecha-
nisms, the results clearly indicate that large savings come at
only a small reduction of the security level. Therefore, we
show that such reactive mechanisms that allow to trade-off
security requirements and load might open the way to really
practical approaches.
Still there is need for ongoing analysis as the reduced
security level might open new attack vectors that we have
only scratched in this paper.
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